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Proposed Revision of New York CPLR
§ 5519 (a)(1)
to Assure Consistency with SEQRA*
I. Introduction
Judicial review of compliance by administrative agencies
with their statutory duty to examine the environmental im-
pact of their actions has been critical to the successful imple-
mentation of the environmental impact statement (EIS) pro-
cess.1 Certain case law developments in New York evince an
inconsistency between the State's EIS process and one aspect
* This Article constitutes the edited text of a report prepared by the Committee
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approved on September 6, 1976. Since the report was approved, it continues to be
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1. The environmental impact statement (EIS) is required by N.Y. Envtl. Con-
serv. Law § 8-0109(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983), see infra note 3.
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of its civil procedures governing judicial review of administra-
tive action. In order to avoid unanticipated environmental
injury in actions by government agencies, a small but critical




On September 1, 1976, the State Environmental Quality
Review Act became effective.2 The Act, known by its acronym
"SEQRA," is directed to assuring that state and local agencies
consider the environmental consequences of their actions.
SEQRA requires that "all agencies... shall prepare or cause
to be prepared.., an environmental impact statement on any
action they propose or approve which may have a significant
effect on the environment."3
2. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117, (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
3. Id. at § 8-0109(2):
2. All agencies (or applicant as hereinafter provided) shall prepare, cause
to be prepared by contract or otherwise an environmental impact
statement on any action they propose or approve which may have a
significant effect on the environment. Such a statement shall include a
detailed statement setting forth the following:
(a) a description of the proposed action and its environmental setting;
(b) the environmental impact of the proposed action including short-
term and long-term effects;
(c) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented;
(d) alternatives to the proposed action;
(e) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented;
() mitigation measures proposed to minimize the environmental im-
pact;
(g) the growth-inducing aspects of the proposed action, where applica-
ble and significant;
(h) effects of the proposed action on the use and conservation of energy
resources, where applicable and significant; and
(i) such other information consistent with the purposes of this article
as may be prescribed in guidelines issued by the commissioner
pursuant to section 8-0113 of this chapter.
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B. Section 5519(a)(1): The Automatic Stay
In County of Franklin v. Connelie4 an early case involv-
ing the interpretation and application of SEQRA, the Super-
intendent of the New York State Police and other defendants
were temporarily and then preliminarily enjoined 5 from pro-
ceeding with the construction of a troop headquarters build-
ing in the Adirondack Park, partly because of their failure to
comply with SEQRA. The defendants served a notice of ap-
peal and invoked CPLR section 5519(a)(1), which provides for
an automatic stay of enforcement of any judgment or order
appealed by a state or local agency. Construction of the
building continued. The Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, in an unpublished per curiam order, refused to vacate
the stay of the preliminary injunction, giving no explanation
for its refusal.6 When the Supreme Court, Franklin County,
finally granted summary judgment, holding that defendants
had failed to comply with SEQRA and enjoining the project
again, construction was well under way.7 Notwithstanding
the final injunction, construction continued because the At-
torney General once again invoked section 5519(a)(1).
Construction proceeded despite three injunctions, be-
cause in each case the Attorney General invoked the auto-
matic stay provided under section 5519(a)(1). When the
Such a statement shall also include copies or a summary of the
substantive comments received by the agency pursuant to subdivision
four of this section, and the agency response to such comments. The
purpose of an environmental impact statement is to provide detailed
information about the effect which a proposed action is likely to have on
the environment, to list ways in which any adverse effects of such an
action might be minimized, and to suggest alternatives to such an action
so as to form the basis for a decision whether or not to undertake or
approve such action. Such statement should be clearly written in a
concise manner capable of being read and understood by the public,
should deal with the specific significant environmental impacts which can
be reasonably anticipated and should not contain more detail than is
appropriate considering the nature and magnitude of the proposed action
and significance of its potential impacts.
4. 95 Misc.2d 189, 408 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Sup. Ct. Essex County 1978).
5. Id. at 195-96.
6. Id.




County of Franklin finally obtained an Appellate Division
review of its summary judgment and injunction on March 29,
1979, a year and two days after the action was commenced,
the Appellate Division reversed Special Term on narrow
grounds holding that plaintiffs lacked standing.8 The court
never construed section 5519(a)(1) in the context of an injunc-
tion ordering compliance with SEQRA.
SEQRA's remedial purpose is to assure that government
officials evaluate the potential environmental harm in pro-
posed actions before undertaking the actions, and avoid that
harm where possible. The Act contemplates judicial enforce-
ment of its review requirements. In County of Franklin v.
Connelie, three different justices, in three sessions of Special
Term, independently ruled that the requirements of SEQRA
had to be observed, and thrice the mere filing of a notice of
appeal under section 5519(a)(1) automatically excused com-
pliance. This application of section 5519(a)(1) has been criti-
cized for being an abuse of a procedural right originally
accorded to government agencies in contexts quite foreign to
judicial review of actions under SEQRA.9 Rather than amend
SEQRA, a statute which does not specifically provide for
injunctions, the Committee on Environmental Law of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Committee)
proposes that section 5519(a)(1) be amended.
III. Proposal to Amend Section 5519(a)(1):
County of Franklin v. Connelie reveals a fatal conflict
between section 5519(a)(1) and SEQRA, as well as the poten-
tial for similar difficulties in cases outside the field of environ-
mental law. The Committee recommends that section
5519(a)(1) be amended by the addition of the following lan-
guage (underlined), thereby making the section inapplicable
to cases in which an injunction has been granted:
8. County of Franklin v. Connelie, 68 A.D.2d 1000, 415 N.Y.S.2d 110 (3d Dept.
1979).
9. See, e.g., N. A. Robinson, Environmental Law: Society-SEQRA-Justice- A
Balancing Act, 180 N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
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(a) Stay without court order. Service upon the adverse
party of a notice of appeal or an affidavit of intention
to move for permission to appeal stays all proceedings
to enforce the judgment or order appealed from pend-
ing the appeal or determination on the motion for
permission to appeal where:
1. the judgment or order directs either the payment of a
sum of money, the assignment or delivery of personal
property, the conveyance of real property, or the
grant or restoration of a license or permit, and the
appellant or moving party is the state or any political
subdivision of the state or any officer or agency of the
state or of any political subdivision of the state; ....
This amendment will preserve the purpose of section
5519(a)(1), which is to maintain the status quo during the
appellate process. 10 This purpose is consistent with SEQRA.
The proposed amendment will return the law to the
procedure which controlled automatic stays prior to changes
made in the CPLR in 1965. The amendment will cure situa-
tions in which government authorities may permanently
frustrate compliance with, and judicial orders under SEQRA,
merely by serving a notice of appeal or intent to appeal, even
if the appeal is not perfected.
IV. Section 5519(a)(1): Origins, Purpose, and SEQRA
A. Origins of Section 5519(a)(1)
The Code of Civil Procedure, section 1314, and its succes-
sor, the Civil Practice Act, section 571, each provided for
automatic stays of "execution and judgment or order" upon
appeal by a municipal corporation. These statutes were inter-
preted as providing that government authorities were enti-
tled to an automatic stay of proceedings where a court had




ordered a prohibitory injunction." The New York Court of
Appeals enunciated the following rationale for this holding
under the Code of Civil Procedure:
It would seem to be preposterous that a party could,
by the mere order of the court staying his hands from a
judgment not yet executed, be deprived of the whole fruit
of the judgment by the lawless act of the defeated party
pending an appeal, without remedy, that he must stand by
and without possibility of redress, see the subject matter of
the litigation destroyed, so that if he succeeds in affirming
the judgment it will be a barren victory.12
When the CPLR was enacted in 1962, section 5519(a)(1)
contained the language which the Committee now proposes
be reinstated, namely, the limitation of the automatic stay to
situations where "the judgment or order directs either the
payment of a sum of money, the assignment or delivery of
personal property, or the conveyance of real property."
B. Purpose of Section 5519(a)(1)
In 1965, the CPLR was amended at the request of the
Attorney General's office to permit government authorities to
obtain a stay, even where an injunction has been ordered. 13
This amendment was accomplished by deleting the phrase
which this Committee recommends be reinserted in the stat-
ute. In addition, the Committee recommends that the phrase
"or the grant or restoration of a license or permit" be included
in the statute. This is also consistent with prior law. Section
571 of the Civil Practice Act had been construed as providing
11. See, e.g., Sixth Avenue R.R. Co. v. Gilbert El. R.R. Co., 71 N.Y. 430 (1877);
New York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. Shea, 30 A. D. 374 (2d Dept. 1898) (Code
of Civil Procedure); City of Buffalo v. Kissinger, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 188 (Erie Co. Ct. 1943)
(Civil Practice Act).
12. Sixth Avenue R.R. Co. v. Gilbert El. R.R. Co., 71 N.Y. 430, 433 (1877).
13. See 7 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice §5519.03 (1981).
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an automatic stay of proceedings in a case where the lower
court ordered the issuance of a building permit.14
The reason for the change in the CPLR in 1965 is unclear.
The Memorandum of the State Department of Education 15
indicates that the bill's supporters mistakenly believed that
practice under the Civil Practice Act was consistent with the
recommended change. Also, the Department of Education
believed that state and local governments would have less
paper work if stays were automatic. In particular, the Depart-
ment seems to have focused on cases involving professional
licensing, the operation of school districts, and similar mat-
ters.
The Committee's proposed amendment recognizes the
public interest in providing for automatic stays in situations
involving zoning changes and the issuance of professional
licenses. However, the Committee believes that the reasons
expressed by the Department are not persuasive when ap-
plied to injunctions to enforce compliance with SEQRA.
C. Section 5519(a)(1) and SEQRA
In the intervening years since the amendment to section
5519(a)(1), various branches of government, as well as the
public, have begun to consider the importance, as well as the
fragility, of the environment. Indeed, section 8-0103 of
SEQRA contains nine points of legislative findings and decla-
rations regarding the importance of the environment and its
"limited capacity." It seems fair to say that in 1965 no one
anticipated that the current version of section 5519(a)(1)
would frustrate the public and the courts in the manner
exemplified by County of Franklin, where construction of the
State Police barracks continued in the face of injunctive relief
granted pending environmental impact review. Similarly, it.
14. In re Wuttke, 202 Misc. 550, 115 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1952).
15. New York State Legislative Annual 1965, pp. 169-70. Similar reasons were
expressed in the Memorandum of the City of New York, prepared by Peter E.




is also appropriate to suggest that the Legislature did not
intend SEQRA to be vitiated in such a way, particularly
where the result may be irreversible damage to the environ-
ment.
Further, the 1965 amendment to section 5519(a)(1) un-
necessarily complicates matters when it is invoked in litiga-
tion between two state agencies, or between a state agency
and a political subdivision of the state. The effect of section
5519(a)(1) is unclear when two government parties seek judi-
cial review of actions each might have taken affecting the
same project under separate statutory authorizations. For
example, when the Freshwater Wetlands Appeals Board re-
versed a decision of the Commissioner of Environmental
Conservation and allowed the Meadow Run Development
Corporation to extend a parking lot in a marshy area near the
Northway,'6 on judicial review instituted by the Commis-
sioner, the Supreme Court in Special Term upheld the
Board.17 Nonetheless, the Commissioner sought to negate
both the Board's ruling and the court's decision simply by
filing a notice of appeal. The Commissioner might stay the
court's dismissal, but he probably could not alter the Board's
underlying ruling. Even so, the Commissioner, through the
Attorney General, directed that the Meadow Run Develop-
ment Corporation not proceed, arguing that the stay had such
an effect. In this case, the expeditious and inexpensive admin-
istrative review of Title 11 of the Freshwater Wetlands Act
was the equivalent of SEQRA. The Legislature's creation of
this procedure was complicated and frustrated by section
5519(a)(1).
The Committee is also not persuaded that section 5519(c),
which provides that "the court from or to which an appeal is
taken or the court of original instance... may vacate, limit or
16. Meadow Run Development Corp. v. Flacke, N.Y. Freshwater Wetlands
Appeals Board #1979-1 (Apr. 20, 1979).
17. Flacke v. Freshwater Wetlands Appeals Board, 100 Misc.2d 393, 418
N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. Essex County 1979), modified, 77 A.D.2d 66, 432 N.Y.S.2d 645
(3d Dept. 1980); rev'd on other grounds, 53 N.Y.2d 537, 444 N.Y.S.2d 48, 428 N.E.2d
380; aff'd on remand, 87 A.D.2d 898, 449 N.Y.S.2d 361 (3d Dept. 1982).
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modify any stay imposed by subdivision (a)," eliminates the
need for the proposed amendment. This subsection of section
5519 puts the burden on the entity seeking to assure compli-
ance with SEQRA. Compliance with SEQRA ensures that
such agencies carefully consider and report on the environ-
mental impact of their actions, which impact, unlike a money
judgment, may be irreversible. Moreover, the proposed
amendment would not prevent the state or local agency from
applying for a stay pursuant to section 5519(c), which also
provides that a court may grant stays of proceedings to
enforce a judgment or order appealed from in cases not pro-
vided for in subsections (a) and (b).
Logically, if the government party has not prevailed in
Special Term, and still wishes to assert grounds for a stay, it
should raise those grounds by application rather than by
invoking an automatic stay. The reason for the stay may then
be given appropriate judicial scrutiny by the Appellate Divi-
sion. Only by such means does civil procedure respect the
dedication of judicial time and consideration by the justices of
Special Term. Where Special Term finds an agency is violat-
ing a state statute, that ruling is entitled to substantial
respect. Section 5519(a)(1) denies both the opinion of Special
Term and the mandate of the Legislature the deference due
them.
V. Conclusion
The proposed amendment to section 5519(a)(1) would
limit the circumstances for which an automatic stay could be
invoked, but would still permit a state or local agency to seek
a stay under section 5519(c). The amendment would merely
shift the burden of obtaining a stay onto the state or local
agency, in a manner consistent with legislative intent con-
cerning environmental protection. The pre-1965 rule in this
regard is sound and should be reinstituted.
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